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Spatial Spectrum Access Game
Xu Chen, Member, IEEE, and Jianwei Huang, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—A key feature of wireless communications is the
spatial reuse. However, the spatial aspect is not yet well un-
derstood for the purpose of designing efficient spectrum sharing
mechanisms. In this paper, we propose a framework of spatial
spectrum access games on directed interference graphs, which
can model quite general interference relationship with spatial
reuse in wireless networks. We show that a pure Nash equilibrium
exists for the two classes of games: (1) any spatial spectrum access
games on directed acyclic graphs, and (2) any games satisfying the
congestion property on directed trees and directed forests. Under
mild technical conditions, the spatial spectrum access games with
random backoff and Aloha channel contention mechanisms on
undirected graphs also have a pure Nash equilibrium. We also
quantify the price of anarchy of the spatial spectrum access
game. We then propose a distributed learning algorithm, which
only utilizes users’ local observations to adaptively adjust the
spectrum access strategies. We show that the distributed learning
algorithm can converge to an approximate mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium for any spatial spectrum access games. Numerical re-
sults demonstrate that the distributed learning algorithm achieves
up to 100% performance improvement over a random access
algorithm.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radio is envisioned as a promising technology
to alleviate the problem of spectrum under-utilization [2].
It enables unlicensed wireless users (secondary users) to
opportunistically access the licensed channels owned by legacy
spectrum holders (primary users), and thus can significantly
improve the spectrum efficiency [2].
A key challenge of the cognitive radio technology is how to
resolve the resource competition by selfish secondary users in
a decentralized fashion. If multiple secondary users transmit
over the same channel simultaneously, severe interferences or
collisions might occur and the individual as well as total data
rates of all users may get reduced. Therefore, it is necessary
to design efficient spectrum sharing mechanisms for cognitive
radio networks.
The competitions among secondary users for common
spectrum have often been studied as a noncooperative game
(e.g., [3]–[6] and the references therein). For example, Nie
and Comaniciu in [4] designed a self-enforcing distributed
spectrum access mechanism based on potential games. Niyato
and Hossain in [5] studied a price-based spectrum access
mechanism for competitive secondary users. Flegyhzi et al. in
[6] proposed a two-tier game framework for medium access
control (MAC) mechanism design.
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Fig. 1. Illustration of distributed spectrum access with spatial reuse under
the protocol interference model. Each user n is represented by a transmitter
Txn and receiver Rxn pair. Users 2 and 3 can not generate interference to
user 1, since user 1’s receiver Rx1 is far from user 2 and 3’s transmitters.
On the other hand, user 1 can generate interference to user 2, since user 2’s
receiver Rx2 is within the transmission range of user 1’s transmitter Tx1.
Similarly, user 2 and user 3 can generate interferences to each other.
When not knowing the spectrum information such as chan-
nel availability, secondary users need to learn the network
environment and adapt the spectrum access decisions accord-
ingly. Han et al. in [7] used the no-regret learning to solve
this problem, assuming that the users’ channel selections are
common information. When users’ channel selections are not
observable, Anandkumar et al. in [8] as well as Liu and
Zhao in [9] designed multi-agent multi-armed bandit learning
algorithms to minimize the expected performance loss of
distributed spectrum access.
A common assumption of the above studies is that sec-
ondary users are close-by and interfere with each other when
they transmit on the same channel simultaneously. However, a
unique feature of wireless communication is spatial reuse. If
users who transmit simultaneously are located sufficiently far
away, then simultaneous transmissions over the same channel
may not cause any performance degradation to the users. Such
spatial effect on spectrum sharing is less understood than many
other aspects in the existing literature [10].
Recently, Tekin et al. in [11] proposed a novel spatial
congestion game framework to take spatial relationship into
account. The key idea is to extend the classical congestion
game upon an undirected graph, by assuming that the in-
terferences among the players are symmetric and a player’s
throughput depends on the number of players in its neighbor-
hood that choose the same resource. However, the interference
relationship among the secondary users can be asymmetric due
to the heterogeneous transmission powers and locations of the
users. We hence propose a more general framework of spatial
spectrum access game on directed interference graphs, which
take users’ heterogeneous resource competition capabilities
Fig. 2. Summary of the results on the existence of both mixed and pure
Nash equilibrium (NE) of spatial spectrum access games. Here CP means
congestion property (see Section IV).
and asymmetric interference relationship into account. The
congestion game on directed graphs has also been studied
in [12], with the assumption that players have linear and
homogeneous payoff functions. The game model in this paper
is more general and allows both linear and nonlinear player-
specific payoff functions. Moreover, we design a distributed
algorithm for achieving the equilibria of the game. The main
results and contributions of this paper are as follows:
• General game formulation: We formulate the distributed
spectrum access problem as a spatial spectrum access
game on directed interference graphs, with user-specific
channel data rates and channel contention capabilities.
• Existence of Nash equilibria: We show by counter exam-
ples that a general spatial spectrum access game may not
have a pure Nash equilibrium. We then show that a pure
strategy equilibrium exists in the following two classes
of games: (1) any spatial spectrum access games on
directed acyclic graphs, and (2) any games satisfying the
congestion property on directed trees and directed forests.
We also show that under mild conditions the spatial
spectrum access games with random backoff and Aloha
channel contention mechanisms on undirected graphs are
potential games and have pure Nash equilibria. We also
quantify the price of anarchy of the spatial spectrum
access game.
• Distributed learning for achieving an approximate Nash
equilibrium: We develop a maximum likelihood estima-
tion approach for estimating user expected throughput
based on local observations. Based on the local esti-
mation of user expected throughputs, we then propose
a distributed learning algorithm that can converge to
an approximate mixed Nash equilibrium for any spatial
spectrum access games. Numerical results demonstrate
that the distributed learning algorithm achieves up-to
100% performance improvement over the random access
algorithm.
Due the space limit, all the proofs in this paper can be found
in the supplementary file on the TMC website or the online
technical report in [13].
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a cognitive radio network with a set M =
{1, 2, ...,M} of independent and stochastically heterogeneous
primary channels. A set N = {1, 2, ..., N} of secondary users
try to access these channels distributively when the channels
are not occupied by primary (licensed) transmissions. Here we
assume that each secondary user is a dedicated transmitter-
receiver pair.
To take users’ spatial relationship into account, we denote
dn = (dTxn , dRxn) as the location vector of secondary
user n, where dTxn and dRxn denote the location of the
transmitter and the receiver, respectively. Each secondary user
n has a interference range νn. Then given the location
vectors of all secondary users, we can obtain the interference
graph G = {N , E} to describe the interference relationship
among the users. Here the vertex set N is the same as the
secondary user set. The edge set is defined as E = {(i, j) :
||dTxi , dRxj || ≤ νi, ∀i, j 6= i ∈ N}, where ||dTxi , dRxj || is
the distance between the transmitter of user i and the receiver
of user j. In general, an interference edge can be directed or
undirected. If an interference edge is directed from secondary
user i to user j, then user j’s data transmission will be affected
by user i’s transmission on the same channel, but user i will
not be affected by user j. If the interference edge is undirected1
between user i and user j, then the two users can affect
each other. Note that a generic directed interference graph
can consist of a mixture of directed and undirected edges.
In the sequel, we call an interference graph undirected, if and
only if all the edges of the graph are undirected. We also
denote the set of users that can cause interference to user n
as Nn = {i : (i, n) ∈ E , i ∈ N}.
Based on the interference model above, we describe the
cognitive radio network with a slotted transmission structure
as follows:
• Channel State: the channel state for a channel m during
time slot t is Sm(t) = 0 if channel m is occupied by
primary transmissions and Sm(t) = 1 otherwise.
• Channel State Transition: for a channel m, the channel
state Sm(t) is a random variable with a probability
density function as ψm. In the following, we denote
the channel idle probability θm as the mean of Sm(t),
i.e., θm = Eψm [Sm(t)]. For example, the state of a
channel changes according to a two-state Markovian
process. We denote the channel state probability vector
of channel m at time t as qm(t) , (Pr{Sm(t) =
0}, P r{Sm(t) = 1}), which forms a Markov chain as
qm(t) = qm(t−1)Γm, ∀t ≥ 1, with the transition matrix
Γm =
[
1− εm εm
ξm 1− ξm
]
.
Furthermore, the long run statistical channel availability
θm ∈ (0, 1) of a channel m can be obtained from the
stationary distribution of the Markov chain, i.e.,
θm =
εm
εm + ξm
. (1)
1Here the edge is actually bi-directed. We follow the conventions in [11]
and ignore the directions on the edge.
As another example, we can also use the channel idle
probability θm to indicate the spectrum availability for
white-space spectrum access. Due to the fact that the ac-
tivities of primary users on TV channels typically change
very slowly, the most recent FCC ruling requires white-
space devices (i.e., secondary users of TV channels) to
determine the spectrum availability via a database [14].
In this case, we can set that θm = 1 if the TV channel
m is vacant for secondary users and θm = 0 otherwise.
• User Specific Channel Throughput: for each secondary
user n, its realized data rate bnm(t) on an idle channelm in
each time slot evolves according to a random process with
a mean Bnm, due to users’ heterogeneous transmission
technologies and the local environmental effects such as
fading. For example, we can compute the data rate bnm(t)
according to the Shannon capacity as
bnm(t) =W log2
(
1 +
ηnz
n
m(t)
ωnm
)
, (2)
where W is the channel bandwidth, ηn is the fixed
transmission power adopted by user n according to the
requirements such as the primary user protection, ωnm
denotes the background noise power, and znm(t) is the
channel gain. In a Rayleigh fading channel environment,
the channel gain znm(t) is a realization of a random
variable that follows the exponential distribution.
• Time Slot Structure: each secondary user n executes the
following stages synchronously during each time slot:
– Channel Sensing: sense one of the channels based
on the channel selection decision made at the end of
previous time slot.
– Channel Contention: Let an be the channel selected
by user n, and a = (a1, ..., aN ) be the channel
selection profile of all users. The probability that user
n can grab the chosen idle channel an during a time
slot is gn(N ann (a)) ∈ (0, 1), which depends on the
subset of user n’s interfering users that choose the
same channel N ann (a) , {i ∈ Nn : ai = an}. Here
are two examples:
1) Random backoff mechanism: the contention stage
of a time slot is divided into λmax mini-slots2. Each
contending user n first counts down according to a
randomly and uniformly generated integer backoff
time counter (number of mini-slots) λn between 1
and λmax. If there is no active transmissions till
the count-down timer expires, the user monitors the
channel and transmits RTS/CTS messages on that
channel. If multiple users choose the same backoff
counter, a collision will occur and no users can grab
the channel successfully. Once successfully gets the
channel, the user starts to transmit its data packet. In
2The contention window size λmax plays an important role for optimizing
the system performance. If λmax is too small, it would increase the collision
probability among users and hence negatively affect the system performance.
In general, if λmax is too large, it would reduce the spectrum access time and
hence reduce the system throughput. To optimize the system performance, we
can adopt the approach in [15] to determine the optimal contention window
size.
this case, we have
gn(N
an
n (a)) = Pr{λn < min
i∈Nn:ai=an
{λi}}
=
λmax∑
λ=1
Pr{λn = λ}Pr{λn < min
i∈Nn:ai=an
{λi}|λn = λ}
=
λmax∑
λ=1
1
λmax
(
λmax − λ
λmax
)Kann (a)
, (3)
where Kann (a) = |N ann (a)| =
∑
i∈Nn
I{ai=an}
denotes the number of user n’s interfering users
choosing the same channel as user n.
2) Aloha mechanism: user n contends for an idle
channel with a probability pn ∈ (0, 1) in a time slot.
If multiple interfering users contend for the same
channel, a collision occurs and no user can grab the
channel for data transmission. In this case, we have
gn(N
an
n (a))=pn
∏
i∈Nann (a)
(1− pi) . (4)
– Data Transmission: transmit data packets if the user
successfully grabs the channel.
– Channel Selection: choose a channel to access during
next time slot according to the distributed learning
algorithm in Section VI.
Under a fixed channel selection profile a, the long-run
average throughput of a secondary user n choosing channel
an can be computed as
Un(a) = θanB
n
angn(N
an
n (a)). (5)
Note that in practices, due to hardware constraint each
secondary user typically cannot observe the channel states of
all the channels in each time slot. In this case, one possible
modeling approach is to formulate the distributed spectrum ac-
cess problem as a partial-observation dynamic game, such that
the game state is defined as the channel states {Sm(t)}Mm=1
in the current time slot, and each secondary user has a partial
observation of the game state in each time slot. However, it
is well-known that such a partial-observation dynamic game
is very difficult to analyze, and is computationally intractable
due to the curse of dimensionality. To enable tractable analysis
and achieve an efficient spectrum access, we hence study
the distributed spectrum access problem from the long-run
average perspective, and utilize the statistical channel avail-
ability information (i.e., channel idle probability θm) to aid
secondary users’ decisions makings. This is because that the
statistical channel availability information can be learned from
the history of a secondary user’s local observations, via the
maximum likelihood estimation approach described in Section
VI. Moreover, the spatial spectrum access game solution in
this paper can help us solve the complete information dynamic
game, where each secondary user is able to globally observe
the channel state realization {Sm(t)}Mm=1 of all the channels
in each time slot. Since the secondary users cannot control the
transition of channel states, we can easily derive the solution
of the complete information dynamic game as follow: for each
time slot t, we solve the corresponding stage spatial spectrum
access game using the algorithm proposed in this paper, with
the channel idle probabilities {θm}Mm=1 of the stage game
replaced by the channel state realization {Sm(t)}Mm=1 of
time slot t. Since our analysis is from the secondary users’
perspective, we will use the terms “secondary user” and “user”
interchangeably.
III. SPATIAL SPECTRUM ACCESS GAME
We now consider the problem that each user tries to
maximize its own throughput by choosing a proper channel
distributively. Let a−n = {a1, ..., an−1, an+1, ..., aN} be the
channels chosen by all other users except user n. Given other
users’ channel selections a−n, the problem faced by a user n
is
max
an∈M
U(an, a−n), ∀n ∈ N . (6)
The distributed nature of the channel selection problem nat-
urally leads to a formulation based on the game theory, such
that users can self organize into a mutually acceptable channel
selection (pure Nash equilibrium) a∗ = (a∗1, a∗2, ..., a∗N ) with
a∗n = arg max
an∈M
U(an, a
∗
−n), ∀n ∈ N . (7)
We thus formulate the distributed channel selection problem
on an interference graphG as a spatial spectrum access game
Γ = (N ,M, G, {Un}n∈N ), where N is the set of players, M
is the set of strategies,G describes the interference relationship
among the players, and Un is the payoff function of player n.
It is known that not every finite strategic game possesses a
pure Nash equilibrium [16]. We then introduce a more general
concept of mixed Nash equilibrium. Let σn , (σn1 , ..., σnM )
denote the mixed strategy of user n, where 0 ≤ σnm ≤
1 is the probability of user n choosing channel m, and∑M
m=1 σ
n
m = 1. For simplicity, we use the same payoff
notation Un(σ1, ...,σN ) to denote the expected throughput
of user n under the mixed strategy profile (σ1, ...,σN ), and
it can be computed as
Un(σ1, ...,σN ) =
M∑
a1=1
σ1a1 ...
M∑
aN=1
σNaNUn(a1, ..., aN ). (8)
Similarly to the pure Nash equilibrium, the mixed Nash
equilibrium is defined as:
Definition 1 (Mixed Nash Equilibrium [16]). The mixed
strategy profile σ∗ = (σ∗1, ...,σ∗N ) is a mixed Nash equilib-
rium, if for every user n ∈ N , we have
Un(σ
∗
n,σ
∗
−n) ≥ Un(σn,σ
∗
−n), ∀σn 6= σ
∗
n,
where σ∗−n denote the mixed strategy choices of all other users
except user n.
One important property deduced from the mixed Nash
equilibrium definition is that if a user assigns some positive
probabilities of choosing some actions, then the expected
payoff of these actions should be the same at the equilibrium.
Otherwise, the user can improve by increasing the probability
of choosing the action with higher expected payoff. In the
spatial spectrum access game, each secondary user takes both
the primary activity levels on different channels and the
competition with other secondary users into consideration,
Fig. 3. An example of spatial spectrum access game without pure Nash
equilibria. There are two channels available and the throughput of a user n is
given as Un(a) = p
∏
i∈N
an
n (a)
(1− p). If all three players (nodes) choose
channel 1, then each player has the incentive of choosing channel 2 to improve
its throughput assuming that the other two players do not change their channel
choices. We can show that such derivation will happen for all 8 possible
strategy profiles a = (a1, a2, a3), where ai ∈ {1, 2} for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
in order to improve its long run average throughput. Nash
equilibrium is the natural solution concept for the spatial
spectrum access game. At a Nash equilibrium, secondary users
are mutually satisfied with their long run average throughputs
and no user can improve by changing its channel unilaterally.
In the following sections, we will study the existence of
both mixed and pure Nash equilibria based on the global
network information, and then discuss how to achieve the Nash
equilibria based on the local user observations only.
IV. EXISTENCE OF NASH EQUILIBRIA
In this part, we study the existence of Nash equilibria in a
spatial spectrum access game. Since a spatial spectrum access
game is a finite strategic game (i.e., with finite number of
players and finite number of channels), we know that it always
admits a mixed Nash equilibrium according to [16].
On the other hand, not every finite strategic game possesses
a pure Nash equilibrium [16]. Compared with mixed Nash
equilibrium, Pure Nash equilibrium can achieve the mutually
satisfactory spectrum sharing solution without requiring the
frequent channel switching and hence helps to reduce the
system overhead such as energy consumption of frequent
channel switching. This motivates us to further investigate
the existence of pure Nash Equilibria of the spatial spectrum
access games.
A. Existence of Pure Nash Equilibria on Directed Interference
Graphs
We first study the existence of pure Nash Equilibria on
directed interference graphs.
First of all, we can construct a game which does not have
a pure Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 1. There exists a spatial spectrum access game on
a directed interference graph not admitting any pure Nash
equilibrium.
Figure 3 shows such an example. It is easy to verify that
for all 8 possible channel selection profiles, there always
exists one user (out of these three users) having an incentive
to change its channel selection unilaterally to improve its
throughput.
We then focus on identifying the conditions under which
the game admits a pure Nash equilibrium. To proceed, we
first introduce the following lemma (the proof is given in the
appendix in the separate supplemental file).
Lemma 1. Assume that any spatial spectrum access game
with N users on a given directed interference graph G has a
pure Nash equilibrium. Then we can construct a new spatial
spectrum access game by adding a new player, who can not
generate interference to any player in the original game and
may receive interference from one or multiple players in the
original game. The new game with N + 1 users also has a
pure Nash equilibrium.
We know that any directed acyclic graph (i.e., a directed
graph contains no directed cycles) can be given a topological
sort (i.e., an ordering of the nodes), such that if node i < j then
there are no edges directed from the node j to node i in the
ordering [17]. This is due to that any spatial spectrum access
game with N = 1 user always has a pure Nash equilibrium.
By the induction argument, we know from Lemma 1 that
Corollary 1. Any spatial spectrum access game on a directed
acyclic graph has a pure Nash equilibrium.
To obtain more insightful results, we next impose the
following property on the spatial spectrum access games:
Definition 2 (Congestion Property). User n’s channel grab-
bing probability gn (N ann (a)) satisfies the congestion property
if for any N˜ ann (a) ⊆ N ann (a), we have
gn(N˜
an
n (a)) ≥ gn (N
an
n (a)) . (9)
Furthermore, a spatial spectrum access game satisfies the
congestion property if (9) holds for all users n ∈ N .
The congestion property (CP) means that the more contend-
ing users exist, the less chance a user can grab the channel.
Such a property is natural for practical wireless systems such
as the random backoff and Aloha systems. We can show that
the following result (the proof is given in the appendix in the
separate supplemental file).
Lemma 2. Assume that any spatial spectrum access game
with N users satisfying the congestion property on a given
directed interference graph G has a pure Nash equilibrium.
Then we can construct a new spatial spectrum access game
by adding a new player, whose channel grabbing probability
satisfies the congestion property and who has an interference
relationship with at most one player n ∈ N in the original
game. The new game with N + 1 users also has a pure Nash
equilibrium.
Definition 3 (Directed Tree [17]). A directed graph is called
a directed tree if the corresponding undirected graph obtained
by ignoring the directions on the edges of the original directed
graph is a tree.
Note that a (undirected) tree is a special case of directed
trees. Since any spatial spectrum access game over a single
node always has a pure Nash equilibrium, we can then
construct the directed tree recursively by introducing a new
node and adding an (directed or undirected) edge between this
node and one existing node. By the induction argument, we
obtain from Lemma 2 that
Corollary 2. Any spatial spectrum access game satisfying
the congestion property on a directed tree has a pure Nash
equilibrium.
Fig. 4. An interference graph that consists of directed acyclic graphs and
directed trees
Definition 4 (Directed Forest [17]). A directed graph is called
a directed forest if it consists of a disjoint union of directed
trees.
Similarly, we can obtain from Lemma 2 that
Corollary 3. Any spatial spectrum access game satisfying
the congestion property on a directed forest has a pure Nash
equilibrium.
Note that directed acyclic graph and directed tree structures
are widely observed in many wireless networking systems such
as wireless ad hoc and sensor networks [18]. For example, the
star topology with sink/hub nodes in wireless sensor networks
is a special case of directed tree. Based on Lemmas 1 and 2, we
can construct more general directed interference graphs over
which a spatial spectrum access game satisfying the congestion
property has a pure Nash equilibrium. Figure 4 illustrates such
an example.
B. Existence of Pure Nash Equilibria on Undirected Interfer-
ence Graphs
We now study the case that the interference graph is
undirected. This is a good approximation of reality if the
transmitter of each user is close to its receiver, and all users’
interference ranges are roughly the same. For example, in
802.11 systems, undirected interference graph is widely used
to approximate the interference relationships since the access
points are typically close to their associated clients and the
carrier sensing ranges are similar.
When an undirected interference graph is a tree, according
to Corollary 2, any spatial spectrum access game satisfying the
congestion property has a pure Nash equilibrium. However, for
those non-tree undirected graphs without a topological sort,
the existence of pure Nash equilibrium can not be proved
following the results in previous Section IV-A. This motivates
us to further study the existence of pure Nash equilibria on
generic undirected interference graphs.
First of all, [19] showed that a 3-players and 3-resources
congestion game with user-specific congestion weights may
not have a pure Nash equilibrium. Such a congestion game
can be considered as a spatial spectrum access game on
a complete undirected interference graph (by regarding the
resources as channels). When all users have homogeneous
channel contention capabilities and all channels have the
same mean data rates, [11] showed that the spatial spectrum
access game on any undirected interference graphs has a
pure Nash equilibrium. Clearly, the applicability of such
a channel-homogeneous model is quite limited, since the
channel throughputs in practical wireless networks are often
heterogeneous. We hence next focus on exploring the random
backoff and Aloha systems with user-specific data rates, which
provide useful insights for the user-homogeneous and user-
heterogeneous channel contention mechanisms, respectively.
Here we resort to a useful tool of potential game3, which
is defined as
Definition 5 (Potential Game [20]). A game is called a
potential game if it admits a potential function Φ(a) such
that for every n ∈ N and a−n ∈MN−1,
sgn
(
Φ(a
′
n, a−n)− Φ(an, a−n)
)
=sgn
(
Un(a
′
n, a−n)− Un(an, a−n)
)
,
where sgn(·) is the sign function.
Definition 6 (Better Response Update [20]). The event
where a player n changes to an action a′n from the action
an is a better response update if and only if Un(a′n, a−n) >
Un(an, a−n).
An appealing property of the potential game is that it always
admits a pure Nash equilibrium and the finite improvement
property, which is defined as
Definition 7 (Finite Improvement Property [20]). A game
has the finite improvement property if any asynchronous better
response update process (i.e., no more than one player updates
the strategy at any given time) terminates at a pure Nash
equilibrium within a finite number of updates.
Based on the potential game theory, we first study the
random backoff mechanism. We show in Theorem 2 that when
the undirected interference graph is complete, there exists
indeed a pure Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 2. Any spatial spectrum access game on a com-
plete undirected interference graph with the random backoff
mechanism is a potential game with the potential function
Φ(a) =
N∏
n=1
θanB
n
an
M∏
m=1
Km(a)∏
c=0
λmax∑
λ=1
1
λmax
(
λmax − λ
λmax
)c
,
(10)
where Km(a) is the number of users choosing channel m
under the strategy profile a, and hence has a pure Nash
equilibrium.
The proof is similar to that in [21], and hence is omitted
here. We then consider the spatial spectrum access game with
the random backoff mechanism on bipartite graphs.
Definition 8 (Bipartite Graph [17]). An undirected graph
is called a bipartite graph if the set of its nodes can be
decomposed into two disjoint sets, such that no two nodes
within the same set are connected by an edge.
Definition 9 (Complete Bipartite Graph [17]). An undirected
graph is called a complete bipartite graph if it is a bipartite
graph and any two nodes selected from the two disjoint sets
respectively are connected by an edge.
3Note that it is much more difficult to find a proper potential function to
take into account users’ asymmetric relationships (i.e., directions of edges on
graph) when the interference graph is directed. Hence in this study we only
apply the tool of potential game in the undirected case.
Definition 10 (Regular Bipartite Graph [17]). An undirected
graph is called a regular bipartite graph if it is a bipartite
graph and each node is connected by the same number of
edges.
Note that a complete bipartite graph that has the same
number of vertices in the two disjoint sets is also a regular
bipartite graph. Many well known graphs such as star graphs,
circulant graphs, cycle graphs with even number of vertexes,
hypercubes, and rectangular lattices are either complete bipar-
tite graphs or regular bipartite graphs. We consider the user
specific throughput as
Un(an, a−n) = hnθanBangn(N
an
n (a)), (11)
where hn represents as a user-specific transmission gain. We
can show that
Theorem 3. Any spatial spectrum access game on either a
complete bipartite interference graph or a regular bipartite
interference graph with user specific transmission gains and
the random backoff mechanism has a pure Nash equilibrium.
The proof is given in the appendix in the separate supple-
mental file. We then consider the random backoff mechanism
in the asymptotic case that λmax goes to infinity. This can be
a good approximation of reality when the number of backoff
mini-slots is much greater than the number of interfering users,
and collision rarely occurs. In this case, we have
gn(N
an
n (a)) = lim
λmax→∞
λmax∑
λ=1
1
λmax
(
λmax − λ
λmax
)Kann (a)
=
∫ 1
0
xK
an
n (a)dx =
1
1 +Kann (a)
, (12)
here Kann (a) denotes the number of users that choose channel
an and can interfere with user n. Equation (12) implies that
the channel opportunity is equally shared among 1+Kann (a)
contending users (including user n). This can also apply
in TDMA channel access mechanism. We consider the user
specific throughput as
Un(an, a−n) = hnθanBan
1
1 +Kann (a)
, (13)
We show that
Theorem 4. Any spatial spectrum access game on any undi-
rected interference graph with user-specific transmission gains
and the random backoff mechanism in the asymptotic case is
a potential game with the potential function
Φ(a) = −
N∑
n=1
(
1 + 12K
an
n (a)
θanBan
)
, (14)
and hence has a pure Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 4 is a direct consequence of the more general result
Theorem 5. More specifically, we generalize the throughput
function in (13) as
Un(an, a−n) = hnθanBan
wn
wn +
∑
i∈Nann (a)
wi
, (15)
where wn > 0 denotes user specific channel sharing weight.
When wn = 1, the throughput function in (15) degenerates
to the equal-sharing case in (13). The physical meaning of
(15) is that the channel is shared among the contending
users according to their weights. We refer this to the spatial
spectrum access game with user specific sharing weights. Such
a proportional channel sharing scheme has been widely used to
model the heterogenous channel access priority assignment for
heterogenous users of different QoS requirements in wireless
networks [22]. We show that
Theorem 5. Any spatial spectrum access game with user
specific sharing weights on any undirected interference graph
is a potential game with the potential function as
Φ(a) = −
N∑
n=1
(
w2n +
1
2
∑
i∈Nann (a)
wnwi
θanBan
)
, (16)
and hence has a pure Nash equilibrium.
The proof is given in the appendix in the separate supple-
mental file. We then consider the random access mechanism
under the scenario where all channels are homogeneous to
each user (i.e., θm = θ and Bm = B for all m ∈ M).
This models the case where a licensed spectrum band of
a large bandwidth (e.g., TV channel) is divided into equal
width logical channels for secondary usage with interleaving
technology at the physical layer (e.g., the IEEE 802.16d/e
standard), such that all channels exhibit the same primary
occupancy and have the same channel gain to the same user
(but still different channel gains for different users). In this
case, the user throughput function is given as
Un(a) = hnθBg(N
an
n (a)). (17)
We can show that the following result (the proof is given
in the appendix in the separate supplemental file).
Theorem 6. Any spatial spectrum access game on any undi-
rected interference graph with homogeneous channels, user-
specific transmission gains, and the random backoff mecha-
nism is a potential game with the potential function
Φ(a) =
N∑
n=1
(
1 +Kann (a)
θB
)
,
and hence has a pure Nash equilibrium.
We now consider the Aloha mechanism. According to (4),
we have the throughput function as
Un(a) = θanB
n
anpn
∏
i∈Nann (a)
(1 − pi). (18)
We can show that the following result (the proof is given in
the appendix in the separate supplemental file).
Theorem 7. Any spatial spectrum access game on any undi-
rected interference graph with the Aloha mechanism is a
potential game with the potential function
Φ(a) =
N∑
i=1
− log(1 − pi)
×
1
2
∑
j∈N
ai
i (a)
log(1− pj) + log
(
θaiB
i
aipi
) ,
and hence has a pure Nash equilibrium.
V. PRICE OF ANARCHY
In previous sections, we have considered the existence of
Nash equilibrium of spatial spectrum access games. We will
further explore the efficiency of the Nash equilibrium.
Following the definition of price of anarchy (PoA) in game
theory [23], we will quantify the efficiency ratio of the worst-
case Nash equilibrium over the centralized optimal solution.
Let Ξ be the set of Nash equilibria of a given spatial spectrum
access game. Then the PoA is defined as
PoA =
mina∈Ξ
∑
n∈N Un(a)
maxa∈MN
∑
n∈N Un(a)
,
which is always not greater than 1. A larger PoA implies that
the set of Nash equilibrium is more efficient (in the worst-
case sense) using the centralized optimum as a benchmark.
Let Vn = maxm∈M{θmBnm}. For a general spatial spectrum
access game, we have the following result.
Theorem 8. The PoA of a spatial spectrum access game Γ =
(N ,M, G, {Un}n∈N ) is at least minn∈N {Vngn(Nn)}maxn∈N Vn .
The proof is given in the appendix in the separate sup-
plemental file. Intuitively, Theorem 8 indicates that we can
increase the efficiency of spectrum sharing by better utilizing
the gain of spatial reuse (i.e., reducing the interference edges
Nn on the interference graph).
VI. DISTRIBUTED LEARNING FOR SPATIAL SPECTRUM
ACCESS GAME
As mentioned in Section III, both pure and mixed Nash
equilibria are important equilibrium concepts for spatial spec-
trum access games, characterizing system states where sec-
ondary users achieve a mutually satisfactory spectrum sharing
solution. We hence consider how to achieve the Nash equilib-
rium for the spatial spectrum access games in this section.
As shown in Section IV, a generic spatial spectrum access
game does not necessarily have a pure Nash equilibrium, and
thus it is impossible to design a mechanism that is guaranteed
to reach a pure Nash equilibrium in general. However, when
the spatial spectrum access game is a potential game, a pure
Nash equilibrium exists. In this case, we can apply the Safe
Experimentation algorithm in [24] for achieving the pure Nash
equilibrium. The key idea is to explore the pure strategy space
based on the finite improvement property of the potential
game. From the practical application’s perspective, we can
apply the results obtained in Section IV to identify whether the
spectrum sharing system satisfies the potential game property.
We can then apply the Safe Experimentation algorithm to
achieve the pure Nash equilibrium when the system possesses
the potential game property.
Since any spatial spectrum access game always admits a
mixed Nash equilibrium, we next target on approaching the
mixed Nash equilibria. From a practical point of view, if
the spectrum sharing system is complex and it is difficult to
verify the existence of pure Nash equilibrium, we can consider
to achieve a mutually satisfactory spectrum sharing solution
by allowing users to choose mixed strategies. Govindan and
Wilson in [25] proposed a global Newton method to compute
the mixed Nash equilibria for any finite strategic games. This
method hence can be applied to find the mixed Nash equilibria
for the spatial spectrum access games. However, such an
approach is a centralized optimization, which requires that
each user has the complete information of other users and
compute the solution accordingly. This is often infeasible in a
cognitive radio network, since acquiring complete information
requires heavy information exchange among the users, and
setting up and maintaining a common control channel for
message broadcasting demands high system overheads [2].
Moreover, this approach is not incentive compatible since
some users may not be willing to share their local information
due to the energy consumption of information broadcasting.
We thus propose a distributed learning algorithm for any
spatial spectrum access games, and the algorithm does not
require any information exchange among users. Each user
only learns to adjust its channel selection strategy adaptively
based on its local throughput observations. We show that the
distributed learning algorithm can converge to a mixed Nash
equilibrium approximately.
A. Expected Throughput Estimation
For the distributed learning algorithm, we consider that each
user does not have the complete network information and
can only estimate its expected throughput locally. Similarly to
the approaches in [26] and [27], we can divide the spectrum
access time into a sequence of decision periods indexed by
T (= 1, 2, ...), where each decision period consists of tmax time
slots. During a single decision period, a user accesses the same
channel in all tmax time slots in order to better understand
the environment. At the end of each decision period T , a
user observes Sn(T, t), In(T, t), and bn(T, t). Here Sn(T, t)
denotes the state of the chosen channel (i.e., whether occupied
by the primary traffic), In(T, t) indicates whether the user has
successfully grabbed the channel, i.e.,
In(T, t) =
{
1, if user n successfully grabs the channel
0, otherwise,
and bn(T, t) is the received data rate on the chosen chan-
nel by user n at time slot t. Note that if Sn(T, t) = 0
(i.e., the channel is occupied by the primary traffic), we set
In(T, t) and bn(T, t) to be 0. At the end of each decision
period T , each user n will have a set of local observations
Ωn(T ) = {Sn(T, t), In(T, t), bn(T, t)}
tmax
t=1 . Based on these
observations, each user can then apply the Maximum Like-
lihood Estimation (MLE) method to estimate its expected
throughput Un. As an example, we next consider the MLE
of user expected throughput in the Markovian channel envi-
ronment introduced in Section II.
We first consider the estimation of the channel idle proba-
bility θm. From the observation set Ωn(T ) at period T , user
n can observe a sequence of channel state transitions as
Sn(T )
= ((Sn(T, 1), Sn(T, 2)) , ..., (Sn(T, tmax − 1), Sn(T, tmax))) .
Here there are four different transition types between adjacent
time slots t and t+1: (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1). We denote
C00(T ), C01(T ), C10(T ), C11(T ) as the number of occur-
rences of the four state transitions types in Sn(T ), respectively.
According to the principle of MLE, user n can then compute
the likelihood function in terms of channel state transition
parameters (εm, ξm) as
L[Ωn(T )|εm, ξm] = Pr{Sn(T )|εm, ξm}
=Pr{Sn(T, 1)|εm, ξm}
×
tmax−1∏
t=1
Pr{Sn(T, t+ 1)|Sn(T, t), εm, ξm}
=Pr{Sn(T, 1)|εm, ξm}
× (1− εm)
C00(T )εC01(T )m (1− ξm)
C11(T )ξC10(T )m .
Then MLE of (εm, ξm) can be computed by maximiz-
ing the log-likelihood function lnL[Ωn(T )|εm, ξm], i.e.,
maxεm,ξm lnL[Ωn(T )|εm, ξm]. By the first order condition,
we obtain the optimal solution as
ε˜m=
C01(T )
C00(T ) + C01(T )
,
ξ˜m=
C10(T )
C11(T ) + C10(T )
.
According to (1), we can then estimate the channel idle
probability θm as
θ˜m =
ε˜m
ε˜m + ξ˜m
.
We then consider the estimation of channel grabbing proba-
bility gn(T ). When a channel is idle (i.e., no primary traffic),
a user n will contend for the channel and can successfully
grab the channel with a probability gn(T ). Since there are a
total of
∑tmax
t=1 Sn(T, t) rounds of channel contentions in the
period T and each round is independent, the total number of
successful channel captures
∑tmax
t=1 In(T, t) by user n follows
the Binomial distribution. User n then computes the likelihood
of gn(T ) as
L[Ωn(T )|gn(T )] =
(∑tmax
t=1 Sn(T, t)∑tmax
t=1 In(T, t)
)
gm(T )
∑tmax
t=1 In(T,t)
× (1− gm(T ))
∑tmax
t=1 Sn(T,t)−
∑tmax
t=1 In(T,t).
Then MLE of gn(T ) can be computed by maximiz-
ing the log-likelihood function lnL[Ωn(T )|gn(T )], i.e.,
maxgn(T ) lnL[Ωn(T )|gn(T )]. By the first order condition, we
obtain the optimal solution as
g˜n(T ) =
∑tmax
t=1 In(T, t)∑tmax
t=1 Sn(T, t)
.
We finally consider the estimation of mean data rate Bnm.
Since the received data rate bn(T, t) is also i.i.d. over different
time slots, similar to the MLE of the channel grabbing
probability gn(T ), we can obtain the MLE of mean data rate
Bnm as
B˜nm =
∑tmax
t=1 bn(T, t)∑tmax
t=1 In(T, t)
.
By the MLE above, we can then estimate the true expected
throughput Un(T ) as U˜n(T ) = θ˜mB˜nmg˜n(T ). In the follow-
ing analysis of distributed learning algorithm, we consider
a general setting where the estimated expected throughput
U˜n(T ) of user n can be noisy. More precisely, we assume
that U˜n(T ) = Un(T )+wn where wn ∈ (w,w) is the random
estimation noise with a probability density function fn(wn)
satisfying E[wn] =
∫ w
w wnfn(wn)dwn = 0.
B. Distributed Learning Algorithm
Based on the expected throughput estimation, we then
propose the distributed learning algorithm for spatial spec-
trum access games. The idea is to extend the principle of
single-agent reinforcement learning to a multi-agent setting.
Such multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithm has also
been applied to the classical congestion games on complete
interference graphs [28], [29] by assuming that users are
homogeneous (i.e., user’s payoff only depends on the number
of users choosing the same resource). Here we extend the
learning algorithm to the generalized spatial congestion games
on any generic interference graphs with heterogeneous users,
which lead to significant differences in analysis. For example,
we show that the convergence condition for the learning
algorithm depends on the structure of spatial reuse, which is
different from those results in [28], [29].
More specifically, at the beginning of each period T , a
user n ∈ N chooses a channel an(T ) ∈ M to access
according to its mixed strategy σn(T ) = (σnm(T ), ∀m ∈M),
where σnm(T ) is the probability of choosing channel m.
The mixed strategy is generated according to P n(T ) =
(Pnm(T ), ∀m ∈ M), which represents its perceptions of the
payoff performance of choosing different channels based on
local estimations. Perceptions are based on local observations
in the past and may not accurately reflect the expected payoff.
For example, if a user n has not accessed a channel m for
many decision intervals, then perception Pnm(T ) can be out of
date. The key challenge for the learning algorithm is to update
the perceptions with proper parameters such that perceptions
equal to expected payoffs at the equilibrium.
Similarly to the single-agent learning, we choose the Boltz-
mann distribution as the mapping from perceptions to mixed
strategies, i.e.,
σnm(T ) =
eγP
n
m(T )∑M
i=1 e
γPni (T )
, ∀m ∈M, (19)
where γ is the temperature that controls the randomness of
channel selections. When γ → 0, each user will choose to
access channels uniformly at random. When γ → ∞, user n
always chooses the channel with the largest perception value
Pnm(T ) among all channel m ∈ M. We will show later on
that the choice of γ trades off convergence and performance
of the learning algorithm.
At the end of a decision period T , a user n estimated its
expected throughput as U˜n(a(T )), and adjusts its perceptions
Algorithm 1 Distributed Learning Algorithm For Spatial
Spectrum Access Game
1: initialization:
2: set the temperature γ.
3: set the initial perception values Pnm(0) = 1M for each
user n ∈ N .
4: end initialization
5: loop for each decision period T and each user n ∈ N in
parallel:
6: select a channel m ∈ M according to (19).
7: estimate the expected throughput U˜n(a(T )).
8: update the perceptions value P n(T ) according to
(20).
9: end loop
as
Pnm(T+1) =
{
(1 − µT )P
n
m(T ) + µT U˜n(a(T )), if an(T ) = m,
Pnm(T ), otherwise,
(20)
where (µT ∈ (0, 1), ∀T ) are the smoothing factors. A user
only changes the perception of the channel just accessed in
the current decision period, and keeps the perceptions of other
channels unchanged.
Algorithm 1 summarizes the distributed learning algorithm.
We then analyze the complexity of the distributed learning
algorithm. In each iteration, Line 6 involves the arithmetic
operations over M channels and hence has the complexity of
O(M). The expected throughput estimation in Line 7 typically
involves the arithmetic operations based on the observations
of the chosen channel in tmax time slots of the decision period
and hence has the complexity of O(tmax). In Line 8, the
perception value update is only carried out in the chosen
channel and hence has the complexity of O(1). Suppose that
it takes K iterations for the algorithm to converge. Then
total computational complexity of the algorithm is at most
O(K(M + tmax)).
C. Convergence of Distributed Learning Algorithm
We now study the convergence of the proposed distributed
learning algorithm based on the theory of stochastic approxi-
mation [30].
First, the perception value update in (20) can be written in
the following equivalent form,
Pnm(T+1)−P
n
m(T ) = µT [Z
n
m(T )−P
n
m(T )], ∀n ∈ N ,m ∈M,
(21)
where Znm(T ) is the update value defined as
Znm(T ) =
{
U˜n(a(T )), if an(T ) = m,
Pnm(T ), otherwise.
(22)
For the sake of brevity, we denote the perception values,
update values, and mixed strategies of all the users as P (T ) ,
(Pnm(T ), ∀m ∈M, n ∈ N ), Z(T ) , (Z
n
m(T ), ∀m ∈ M, n ∈
N ), and σ(T ) , (σnm(T ), ∀m ∈M, n ∈ N ), respectively.
Let Pr{Nmn (a(T ))|P (T ), an(T ) = m} denote the condi-
tional probability that, given that the users’ perceptions are
P (T ) and user n chooses channel m, the set of users that
choose the same channel m in user n’s neighborhood Nn is
Nmn (a(T )) ⊆ Nn. Since each user independently chooses
a channel according to its mixed strategy σn(T ), then the
random set Nmn (a(T )) follows the Binomial distribution of
|Nn| independent non-homogeneous Bernoulli trials with the
probability mass function as
Pr{Nmn (a(T ))|P (T ), an(T ) = m}
=
∏
i∈Nmn (a(T ))
(σim(T ))
∏
i∈Nn\Nmn (a(T ))
(1− σim(T ))
=
∏
i∈Nn
(σim(T ))
I{ai(T )=m}(1 − σim(T ))
1−I{ai(T )=m} , (23)
where I{ai(T )=m} = 1 if user i chooses channel m, and
I{ai(T )=m} = 0 otherwise.
Since the update value Znm(T ) depends on user n’s esti-
mated throughput U˜n(a(T )) (which in turn dependents on
Nmn (a(T ))), thus Znm(T ) is also a random variable. The
equations in (21) are hence stochastic difference equations,
which are difficult to analyze directly. We thus focus on the
analysis of its mean dynamics [30]. To proceed, we define
the mapping from the perceptions P (T ) to the expected
throughput of user n choosing channel m as Qnm(P (T )) ,
E[Un(a(T ))|P (T ), an(T ) = m]. Here the expectation E[·] is
taken with respective to the mixed strategies σ(T ) of all users
(i.e., the perceptions P (T ) of all users due to (19)). We show
that
Lemma 3. For the distributed learning algorithm, if the
temperature satisfies
γ <
1
2maxm∈M,n∈N{θmBnm}maxn∈N {|Nn|}
, (24)
the mapping from the perceptions to the expected through-
put Q(P (T )) , (Qnm(P (T )),m ∈M, n ∈ N ) forms a
maximum-norm contraction.
The proof is given in the appendix in the separate sup-
plemental file. Lemma 3 implies that when the interference
among users becomes more severe (i.e., the maximum degree
maxn∈N {|Nn|} of the interference graph becomes larger), a
smaller γ is needed to guarantee the convergence. This is
because that interference relationship among users becomes
more complicated and users should put more weight to explore
the environment. Note that the condition (24) is a sufficient
condition to form a contraction mapping, which is in turn is a
sufficient condition for convergence. Simulation results show
that a slightly larger γ may also lead to the convergence of
the mapping. Based on the property of contraction mapping,
there exists a fixed point P ∗ such that Q(P ∗) = P ∗. By
the theory of stochastic approximations [30], the distributed
learning algorithm will also converge to the same limit point
P
∗
.
Theorem 9. For the distributed learning algorithm, if the
temperature γ satisfies (24), ∑T µT =∞ and ∑T µ2T <∞,
then the sequence {P (T ), ∀T ≥ 0} converges to the unique
limit point P ∗ , (Pn∗m , ∀m ∈ M, n ∈ N ) satisfying that
Qnm(P
∗) = Pn∗m , ∀m ∈ M, n ∈ N . (25)
We next explore the property of the equilibrium P ∗ of the
distributed learning algorithm. From Theorem 9, we see that
Qnm(P
∗) = E[Un(a(T ))|P
∗, an(T ) = m] = P
n∗
m . (26)
It means that the perception value Pn∗m is an accurate estima-
tion of the expected throughput in the equilibrium. Moreover,
we show that the mixed strategy σ∗ is an approximate Nash
equilibrium.
Definition 11 (Approximate Nash Equilibrium [31]). A
mixed strategy profile σ¯ = (σ¯1, ..., σ¯N ) is a δ- approximate
Nash equilibrium if
Un(σ¯n, σ¯−n) ≥ max
σn
Un(σn, σ¯−n)− δ, ∀n ∈ N ,
where Un(σ¯n, σ¯−n) denotes the expected throughput of player
n under mixed strategy σ¯, and σ¯−n denotes the mixed strategy
profile of other users except player n.
Here δ ≥ 0 is the gap from a (precise) mixed Nash
equilibrium. For the distributed learning algorithm, we show
that
Theorem 10. For the distributed learning algorithm, the
mixed strategy σ∗ in the equilibrium P ∗ is a δ-approximate
Nash equilibrium, with δ = maxn∈N {− 1γ
∑M
m=1 σ
n∗
m lnσ
n∗
m }.
The proof is given in the appendix in the separate sup-
plemental file. The gap δ can be interpreted as the weighted
entropy, which describes the randomness of the learning
exploration. A larger δ means a worse learning performance.
When each user adopts the uniformly random access, the gap
δ reaches the maximum value and results in the worst learning
performance. In this case, we can obtain the upper-bound of
the gap δ as − 1γ
∑M
m=1
1
M ln
1
M =
1
γ lnM. Theorems 9 and
10 together illustrate the trade-off between the exploration
and exploitation through the choice of γ. A small enough
γ is required to explore the environment (so that users will
not put too many weights on exploitation and get stuck in
channels with the current best throughputs) and guarantee
the convergence of distributed learning to the approximate
mixed Nash equilibrium. If γ is too small, however, then the
performance gap δ is large due to over-exploration. Numerical
results in Section VIII demonstrate that, by a proper choice
of the temperature γ, the performance loss of the approximate
mixed Nash equilibrium obtained by distributed learning is at
most 10% compared with the exact mixed Nash equilibrium.
VII. EXTENSION TO PHYSICAL INTERFERENCE MODEL
In previous sections, we have focused on studying the
spatial spectrum access game under the protocol interference
model, which has been widely adopted in wireless network
research literature [32], [33]. The protocol interference model
uses the interference graph to describe the pair-wide interfer-
ence relationships among users, i.e., two users can interfere
with each other if they are within each other’s interference
range. This is useful for modeling the data transmission con-
fliction when some random access MAC protocol is adopted.
For example, in 802.11 networks, we can construct the in-
terference graph by setting the carrier sensing range as the
interference range. Moreover, by carefully constructing the
interference edges via the reality check approach in [32] or
the measurement-calibrated propagation scheme in [33], the
protocol interference model can provide a good approximation
to the physical interference model that captures the continuous
nature of interference and takes into account the accumulated
interference from multiple concurrent transmitters [34], [35].
We next study the spatial spectrum access game under the
setting of physical interference model. According to [34],
we can compute the data rate of user n under the physical
interference model as
Un(a) = θmW log2
(
1 +
ηnd
−α
n
ω0 + ωnan +
∑
i∈N/{n}:ai=an
ηid
−α
in
)
.
(27)
Here W is the channel bandwidth, ηi is the transmission
power of user n, α is the path loss factor, and d−αn denotes
the channel gain between the transmitter and the receiver of
user n due to free-space attenuation [34]. Furthermore, ω0
denotes the background noise, ωnan denotes the the interference
from primary users to secondary user n on channel an, ηid−αin
denotes the interference generated by user i to user n, and∑
i∈N\{n}:ai=an
ηid
−α
in denotes the accumulated interference
from other second users to user n. Similarly to the setting
of protocol interference model, we can model the distributed
spectrum access problem among users under the physical
interference model as a spatial spectrum access game with the
payoff function given as in (27). We can show the following
result for the case that the channel availability θm of all
channels are homogeneous, i.e., θm = θ for any m ∈M.
Theorem 11. When the channel availabilities of all channels
are homogeneous, the spatial spectrum access game under
the physical interference model is a potential game with the
potential function given as
Φ(a) = −
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
ηiηjd
−α
ij I{ai=aj} − 2
N∑
n=1
ηn
(
ωnan + ω0
)
,
and hence has a pure Nash equilibrium.
The proof is given in the appendix in the separate sup-
plemental file. Since the spatial spectrum access game is a
potential game, we can then apply the Safe Experimentation
algorithm in [24] for achieving the pure Nash equilibrium.
For the general case that the channel availabilities are hetero-
geneous, the analysis of spatial spectrum access game is very
challenging and will be considered in a future work.
VIII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We now evaluate the proposed distributed learning algo-
rithm by simulations. We consider a Rayleigh fading chan-
nel environment. The data rate of user n on an idle chan-
nel m is given according to the Shannon capacity, i.e.,
bnm(t) = W log2
(
1 +
ηnz
n
m(t)
ωnm
)
. We consider the Rayleigh
fading channel environment where channel gain znm(t) is a
random variable that follows the exponential distribution with
Fig. 5. Interference Graphs
the mean z¯nm. In the following simulations, we set W = 10
MHz, ωnm = −100 dBm, and ηn = 100 mW. By choosing
different mean channel gains z¯nm, we have different mean data
rates Bnm = E[b
n
m(t)] for different channels and users. We set
the channel idle probability θm = 0.5.
We consider a network of M = 5 channels and N = 9
users with four different interference graphs (see Figure 5).
Graphs (a) and (b) are undirected, and Graphs (c) and (d)
are directed. Let Bn = {Bn1 , ..., BnM} be the mean data rate
vector of user n. We set B1 = B2 = B3 = {2, 6, 16, 20, 30}
Mbps, B4 = B5 = B6 = {4, 12, 32, 40, 60} Mbps, and
B7 = B8 = B9 = {10, 30, 80, 100, 150} Mbps. We
implement both the random backoff and Aloha mechanisms for
channel contention. For the random backoff mechanism, we set
the number of backoff mini-slots in a time slot λmax = 10. For
the Aloha mechanism, the channel contention probabilities of
the users are randomly assigned from the set {0.3, 0.5, 0.7}.
Notice that in this study we focus on channel choices in-
stead of the adjustment of contention probabilities. For the
distributed learning algorithm initialization,we set the smooth
factor µT = 1T , which satisfies the condition
∑
T µT = ∞
and
∑
T µ
2
T <∞.
We first evaluate the distributed learning algorithm with
different choices of temperature γ on the interference graph (d)
in Figure 5. We run the learning algorithm sufficiently long
until the time average system throughput does not change.
The result in Figure 6 shows the system performance with
different γ, and demonstrates that a proper temperature γ can
achieve a balance between exploration and exploitation and
offer the best performance. When is γ small, the users tend to
select the channels randomly (i.e., over-exploration) and the
performance gap δ can be large. When γ is very large, the
algorithm focuses on exploitation and may get stuck in local
optimum and the performance is again negatively affected. In
the following simulations we set γ = 5.0 since it achieves
good system performance in both random backoff and Aloha
mechanisms as in Figure 6.
We then evaluate the convergence of the distributed learning
algorithm. In Figure 7, we show the number of iterations
for the convergence of distributed learning algorithm with
random backoff and Aloha mechanisms. We see that, as the
interference graph becomes more dense (e.g., graph (b)), the
convergence time becomes longer. The reason is that, when the
interference graph becomes more dense and a user can gener-
ate interference to more users, the environment becomes more
complex and it hence takes more time overhead to explore. We
also observe that the convergence time of Aloha mechanism
is longer than that of random backoff mechanism. This is
because that in Aloha mechanism users are heterogeneous in
terms of channel contention capability and hence the system
environment becomes more complicated.
We further compare distributed learning with the solutions
obtained by the following algorithms:
• Random Access: each user chooses a channel to access
purely randomly.
• Multi-armed Bandit: we implement the multi-armed ban-
dit solution for distributed spectrum access in [36].
• Mixed NE: we compute the exact mixed Nash equilibrium
of the spatial spectrum access game, based on statistical
network information using the global Newton method
[25].
• Dynamic Game: we compute the solution of the com-
plete information dynamic game for spectrum access, by
solving the corresponding stage spatial spectrum access
game (using the global Newton method) for each time
slot t, with the channel idle probabilities {θm}Mm=1 of
the stage game replaced by the channel state realization
{Sm(t)}Mm=1 of time slot t.
• Centralized Optimization: the solution obtained by solv-
ing the centralized global optimization of
maxa
∑
n∈N Un(a).
We implement these algorithms together with the distributed
learning algorithm on the four types of interference graphs in
Figure 5. The results are shown in Figures 8 and 9. We see that
the exact mixed Nash equilibrium of spatial spectrum access
game based on statistical network information is efficient, with
a less than 8% performance loss compared with the dynamic
game solution. This is because that in the proposed spatial
spectrum access game, each secondary user takes both the pri-
mary activity levels on different channels and the competition
with other secondary users into consideration. This can help
to mitigate the congestion within secondary users and exploit
the channels of high transmission opportunities. Moreover, the
performance gap δ of the approximate mixed Nash equilibrium
by distributed learning from the exact mixed Nash equilibrium
is small, with a less than 10% performance loss in all cases.
For the random backoff (Aloha, respectively) mechanism,
we see that the distributed learning algorithm achieves up-
to 100% (65%, respectively) performance improvement over
the random access algorithm. Moreover, we observe that the
distributed learning algorithm can achieve better performance
than the multi-armed bandit scheme, with a performance gain
of up-to 15%. This is because that the design of multi-armed
bandit scheme does not take the spatial reuse effect in account.
Compared with the centralized optimal solution, the perfor-
mance loss of the distributed learning in the full-interference
graph (b) is 28% (34%, respectively). Such performance loss is
not due to the algorithm design; instead it is due to the selfish
nature of the users (i.e., competition in distributed spectrum
sharing). In the partial-interference graphs (a), (c), and (d),
the performance loss can be further reduced to less than 10%
(17%, respectively). This shows that the negative impact of
users’ selfish behavior is smaller when users can share the
spectrum more efficiently through spatial reuse.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we explore the spatial aspect of distributed
spectrum sharing, and propose a framework of spatial spec-
trum access game on directed interference graphs. We investi-
gate the critical issue of the existence of pure Nash equilibria,
and develop a distributed learning algorithm converging to an
approximate mixed Nash equilibrium for any spatial spectrum
access games. Numerical results show that the algorithm is
efficient and has significant performance gain over a random
access algorithm that does not take the spatial effect into
consideration.
For the future work, we are going to design distributed
spectrum access mechanisms that can converge to pure Nash
equilibria for those spatial spectrum games which are not
potential games but admit pure Nash equilibria. We will also
study the general spatial spectrum access game under the
physical interference model.
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X. APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose that the original spatial spectrum access game on
the interference graph G has a pure Nash equilibrium a∗. We
index the newly added player as player N +1, denote the set
of players that can generate interference to player N + 1 as
I(a∗), and denote the set of player N+1’s interfering players
that choose channel m as Im(a∗) , {n ∈ I(a∗) : a∗n = m}.
Now player N + 1 can compute its best response strategy
a∗N+1 = argmaxa∈M{θaB
N+1
a gN+1(Ia(a
∗))}. Obviously,
the strategy profile (a∗, a∗N+1) of N + 1 players in the new
game is a pure Nash equilibrium.
B. Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose that the original spatial spectrum access game has a
pure Nash equilibrium a∗. We index the newly added player
as player N + 1. Now player N + 1 can compute its best
response strategy a∗N+1 as follows.
Case 1: if player N + 1 does not have an interference
relationship with any player in the original game, then
a∗N+1 = argmax
a∈M
{θaB
N+1
a gN+1(∅)}. (28)
In this case, the strategy profile (a∗, a∗N+1) of N + 1 players
in the new game is a pure Nash equilibrium.
Case 2: if player N+1 can not generate interference to any
player in the original game, and there is one player n ∈ N
that can generate interference to player N + 1, then
a∗N+1
=argmax
a∈M
{max
a 6=a∗n
{θaB
N+1
a gN+1(∅)}, θa∗nB
N+1
a∗n
gN+1({n})}.
(29)
According to Lemma 1, the strategy profile (a∗, a∗N+1) must
be a pure Nash equilibrium of the new game.
Case 3: If player N+1 can generate interference to a player
n ∈ N in the original game, then player N + 1 can compute
its best response strategy a∗N+1 according to (29) if player n
can also generate interference to player N +1, and according
to (28) otherwise. By checking that whether a∗N+1 and a∗n are
the same, we have the following two possibilities.
1) If a∗N+1 6= a∗n, then the strategy profile (a∗, a∗N+1) must
be a pure Nash equilibrium for the new game.
2) If a∗N+1 = a∗n, we modify the original game as follows.
For player n, we modify the utility function as Uˆn(a) =
θanB
n
angn(N
an
n (a) ∪ {N + 1}) if an = a∗N+1 and Uˆn(a) =
Un(a) otherwise. For any other player i 6= n and i ∈ N , we
keep the utility function unchanged, i.e., Uˆi(a) = Ui(a). For
the modified game with the utility function {Uˆi(a)}i∈N , it
is easy to check that it also satisfies the congestion property
and hence it has a pure Nash equilibrium aˆ∗ by assumption
(since this game is still played over the same given interference
graph and any game satisfying the congestion property on
original interference graph has a pure Nash equilibrium by
assumption). If aˆ∗n = a∗N+1, the strategy profile (aˆ∗, a∗N+1)
is a pure Nash equilibrium for the new game with N + 1
players, since given the interference between player n and
player N + 1, any player i ∈ N ∪ {N + 1} is playing the
best response strategy. If aˆ∗n 6= a∗N+1, we can show that the
strategy profile (aˆ∗, a∗N+1) is still a pure Nash equilibrium for
the new game. This is because that, without the interference
between player n and player N + 1 (since they play different
strategies), playing strategy a∗N+1 can not be worse due to the
congestion property gN+1(∅) ≥ gN+1({n}) and hence is still
player N + 1’s best response. For any player i ∈ N in the
original game, playing aˆ∗i is the best response strategy given
player N + 1’s strategy a∗N+1.
C. Proof of Theorem 3
We first consider the complete bipartite graph. Since the
interference graph is bipartite, we can decompose the set of
vertices into two disjoint sets V1 and V2. Let Di = |Vi| denote
the number of vertices in set Vi for i ∈ {1, 2}. Without loss
of generality, we will assume that D1 ≥ D2. According to
the definition of bipartite graph, we see that two users can
generate interference to each other if and only they are from
different sets.
Recall that the channel grabbing probability of the ran-
dom backoff mechanism is given in (3). We define that
f(Kann (a)) , gn(N
an
n (a)), where Kann (a) is the number
of contending users with user n. We then order the channels
such that θ1˜B1˜f(0) ≥ θ2˜B2˜f(0) ≥ ... ≥ θM˜BM˜f(0). If
θ1˜B1˜f(D1) ≥ θ2˜B2˜f(0), we can trivially construct a pure
Nash equilibrium by assigning each user with channel 1˜. If
θ1˜B1˜f(D1) < θ2˜B2˜f(0), we can construct a pure Nash equi-
librium by assigning users in set V1 with channel 1˜ and users in
set V2 with channel 2˜. In this case, the throughput of a user n
in set V1 is hnθ1˜B1˜f(0) ≥ hnθ2˜B2˜f(D2) and the throughput
of a user n′ in set V2 is hn′ θ2˜B2˜f(0) > hn′ θ1˜B1˜f(D1). No
user has the incentive to deviate.
For the regular bipartite graph case, we define that D1 =
D2 = D where D is the node degree of the graph (i.e., the
number of edges connected by each node). It is then easy
to check that the above procedure of constructing pure Nash
equilibrium is still valid.
D. Proof of Theorem 5
For the ease of exposition, we first define that
Φmn (a) = −
(
1
2
∑
i∈Nann (a)
wnwi
θanBan
)
I{an=m}.
Thus, we have Φ(a) =
∑N
n=1
∑M
m=1Φ
m
n (a)−
∑N
n=1
w2n
θakBak
.
Now suppose that a user k unilaterally changes its strategy
ak to a
′
k, such that the strategy profile changes from a to a
′
.
We have that
Φ(a
′
)− Φ(a)
=
M∑
m=1
Φmk (a
′
)−
M∑
m=1
Φmk (a) +
∑
i∈Nk
(
Φ
a
′
k
i (a
′
)− Φ
a
′
k
i (a)
)
+
∑
i∈Nk
(
Φaki (a
′
)− Φaki (a)
)
−
w2k
θa′
k
Ba′
k
+
w2k
θakBak
. (30)
For the part
∑M
m=1Φ
m
k (a
′
)−
∑M
m=1Φ
m
k (a), we have
M∑
m=1
Φmk (a
′
)−
M∑
m=1
Φmk (a) = Φ
a
′
k
k (a
′
)− Φakk (a)
= −
wk
1
2
∑
i∈N
a
′
k
k (a
′ )
wi
θa′
k
Ba′
k
+
wk
1
2
∑
i∈N
ak
k (a)
wi
θakBak
. (31)
For the part Φa
′
k
i (a
′
)− Φ
a
′
k
i (a), we have
Φ
a
′
k
i (a
′
)− Φ
a
′
k
i (a)
=−
1
2wi
θa′k
Ba′k
 ∑
j∈N
a
′
k
i (a
′ )
wj
 I{ai=a′k}
+
1
2wi
θa′k
Ba′k
 ∑
j∈N
a
′
k
i (a)
wj
 I{ai=a′k}
=−
1
2wi
θa′
k
Ba′
k
 ∑
j∈N
a
′
k
i (a
′ )
wj −
∑
j∈N
a
′
k
i (a)
wj
 I{ai=a′k}
=−
1
2wiwk
θa′
k
Ba′
k
I{ai=a
′
k
}.
This implies that∑
i∈Nk
(
Φ
a
′
k
i (a
′
)− Φ
a
′
k
i (a)
)
=
∑
i∈Nk
−
1
2wiwk
θa′
k
Ba′
k
I{ai=a
′
k
}
=−
1
2wk
θa′k
Ba′k
∑
i∈N
a
′
k
k (a
′)
wi. (32)
Similarly, we have that∑
i∈Nk
(
Φaki (a
′
)− Φaki (a)
)
=
1
2wk
θakBak
∑
i∈N
ak
k (a)
wi. (33)
Substituting (31), (32), and (33) into (30), we obtain that
Φ(a
′
)− Φ(a)
=−
wk
∑
i∈N
a
′
k
k
(a′)
wi
θa′k
Ba′k
−
w2k
θa′k
Ba′k
+
wk
∑
i∈N
ak
k
(a) wi
θakBak
+
w2k
θakBak
=
1
hk
θa′k
Ba′k
θakBak
∑
i∈N
a
′
k
k (a
′)
wi
∑
i∈N
ak
k (a)
wi
(
Uk(a
′
)− Uk(a)
)
,
which completes the proof.
E. Proof of Theorem 6
We first define that Uˆn(a) = hnθBKann (a) an U¯n(a) =
hnθB
1
1+Kann (a)
. It is easy to check that
sgn(Uˆn(an, a−n)− Uˆn(a
′
n, a−n))
=− sgn(U¯n(an, a−n)− U¯n(a
′
n, a−n)). (34)
Since the random backoff mechanism is adopted, according
to (3), we have that
sgn(Un(an, a−n)− Un(a
′
n, a−n))
= sgn(Uˆn(an, a−n)− Uˆn(a
′
n, a−n)). (35)
By Theorem 4, we know that the spatial spectrum access
game with throughput function U¯n(a) on any undirected
graph is a potential game with potential function Φ(a) =
−
∑N
n=1
(
1+Kann (a)
θB
)
. It hence follows from (34) and (35)
that the spatial spectrum access game with throughput function
Un(a) in (17) on any undirected graph is also a potential game
with potential function −Φ(a).
F. Proof of Theorem 7
For the ease of exposition, we first define ρi , log(1− pi),
ξim,d , log(θmB
i
m,dpi), and
Φmi (a) = −ρi
1
2
∑
j∈Nmi (a)
ρj + ξ
i
m,di
 I{ai=m}.
Thus, we have Φ(a) =
∑N
i=1
∑M
m=1Φ
m
i (a).
Now suppose that a user k unilaterally changes its strategy
ak to a
′
k. Let a′ = (a1, ..., ak−1, a
′
k, ak+1, ..., aN ) be the new
strategy profile. Thus, the change in potential Φ from a to a′
is given by
Φ(a
′
)− Φ(a) =
N∑
i=1
M∑
m=1
Φmi (a
′
)−
N∑
i=1
M∑
m=1
Φmi (a)
=
M∑
m=1
Φmk (a
′
)−
M∑
m=1
Φmk (a) +
∑
i∈Nk
M∑
m=1
Φmi (a
′
)−
∑
i∈Nk
M∑
m=1
Φmi (a)
=
(
M∑
m=1
Φmk (a
′
)−
M∑
m=1
Φmk (a)
)
+
∑
i∈Nk
(
Φ
a
′
k
i (a
′
)− Φ
a
′
k
i (a)
)
+
∑
i∈Nk
(
Φaki (a
′
)− Φaki (a)
)
. (36)
Equation (36) consists of three parts. Next we analyze each
part separately. For the first part, we have
M∑
m=1
Φmk (a
′
)−
M∑
m=1
Φmk (a) = Φ
a
′
k
k (a
′
)− Φakk (a)
=− ρk
12 ∑
j∈N
a
′
k
k (a
′)
ρj + ξ
k
a
′
k
,dk
+ ρk
1
2
∑
j∈N
ak
k (a)
ρj + ξ
k
ak,dk
 .
(37)
For the second part in (36),
Φ
a
′
k
i (a
′
)− Φ
a
′
k
i (a)
=− ρi
12 ∑
j∈N
a
′
k
i (a
′)
ρj + ξ
i
a
′
k,di
 I{ai=a′k}
+ ρi
12 ∑
j∈N
a
′
k
i (a)
ρj + ξ
i
a
′
k,di
 I{ai=a′k}
=−
1
2
ρi
 ∑
j∈N
a
′
k
i (a
′ )
ρj −
∑
j∈N
a
′
k
i (a)
ρj
 I{ai=a′k}
=−
1
2
ρiρkI{ai=a
′
k}
.
This means∑
i∈Nk
(
Φ
a
′
k
i (a
′
)− Φ
a
′
k
i (a)
)
=
∑
i∈Nk
−
1
2
ρiρkI{ai=a
′
k}
= −
1
2
ρk
∑
i∈N
a
′
k
k (a
′)
ρi. (38)
For the third term in (36), we can similarly get∑
i∈Nk
(
Φaki (a
′
)− Φaki (a)
)
=
1
2
ρk
∑
i∈N
a
′
k
k (a)
ρi. (39)
Substituting (37), (38), and (39) into (36), we obtain
Φ(a
′
)− Φ(a)
=− ρk
 ∑
j∈N
a
′
k
k (a
′ )
ρj + ξ
k
a
′
k,dk
−
∑
j∈N
ak
k (a)
ρj − ξ
k
ak,dk

=− ρk
(
logUk(a
′
)− logUk(a)
)
. (40)
Since −ρk = − log(1− pk) > 0 and
sgn
(
Un(a
′
n, a−n)− Un(an, a−n)
)
=sgn
(
logUn(a
′
n, a−n)− logUn(an, a−n)
)
,
we can conclude that Φ(a) is a potential function.
G. Proof of Theorem 8
First of all, since gn(N ann (a)) ≤ 1, we know that Un(a) =
θmB
n
mgn(N
an
n (a)) ≤ Vn. Thus, it follows that
max
a
∑
n∈N
Un(a) ≤
∑
n∈N
Vn. (41)
Suppose that a˜ ∈ Ξ is an arbitrary Nash equilibrium of the
spatial spectrum access game Γ. Then at Nash equilibrium,
we must have that
Un(a˜) ≥ Vngn(Nn). (42)
Otherwise, the user n can always improve its payoff by
choosing the channel that maximizes θmBnm, which would
contradict with the fact that a˜ is a Nash equilibrium. Accord-
ing to (41) and (42), we then obtain that
PoA≥
∑
n∈N Un(a˜)
maxa
∑
n∈N Un(a)
≥
∑
n∈N Vngn(Nn)∑
n∈N Vn
≥
N minn∈N {Vngn(Nn)}
N maxn∈N Vn
=
minn∈N {Vngn(Nn)}
maxn∈N Vn
.
H. Proof of Lemma 3
This proof is derived based on the one in [29]. The key
difference is that we consider that the generalized spatial
congestion games on any generic graphs and users can be
heterogenous. While, [29] only considers the special case that
the congestion game is defined over the complete graphs and
users are homogenous.
According to (23), we first compute the expected payoff as
Qnm(P (T )) =
∑
Nmn (a(T ))⊆Nn
θmB
n
m
× gn(N
m
n (a(T )))Pr{N
m
n (a(T ))|P (T ), an(T ) = m}.
(43)
We now consider the difference in expected payoffs between
Qnm(P (T )) and Qnm(Pˆ (T )) given two arbitrary perceptions
P (T ) and Pˆ (T ) as
|Qnm(P (T ))−Q
n
m(Pˆ (T ))|
=θmB
n
m|
∑
Nmn (a(T ))⊆Nn
gn(N
m
n (a(T )))
×
∏
i∈Nn
(σim(T ))
I{ai(T )=m}(1 − σim(T ))
1−I{ai(T )=m}
−
∑
Nmn (a(T ))⊆Nn
gn(N
m
n (a(T )))
×
∏
i∈Nn
(σˆim(T ))
I{ai(T )=m}(1 − σˆim(T ))
1−I{ai(T )=m} |
≤θmB
n
m
∑
Nmn (a(T ))⊆Nn
gn(N
m
n (a(T )))
× |
∏
i∈Nn
(σim(T ))
I{ai(T )=m}(1 − σim(T ))
1−I{ai(T )=m}
−
∏
i∈Nn
(σˆim(T ))
I{ai(T )=m}(1 − σˆim(T ))
1−I{ai(T )=m} |
≤θmB
n
m
∑
Nmn (a(T ))⊆Nn
|
∏
i∈Nn
(σim(T ))
I{ai(T )=m}(1− σim(T ))
1−I{ai(T )=m}
−
∏
i∈Nn
(σˆim(T ))
I{ai(T )=m}(1 − σˆim(T ))
1−I{ai(T )=m} |.
(44)
For sake of brevity, we define that
ψ(σ(T ), σˆ(T ), k)
,
∏
i≤k:i∈Nn
(σim(T ))
I{ai(T )=m}(1− σim(T ))
1−I{ai(T )=m}
×
∏
i>k:i∈Nn
(σˆim(T ))
I{ai(T )=m}(1 − σˆim(T ))
1−I{ai(T )=m} .
Here we index all users in the set Nn arbitrarily as
1, 2, ..., |Nn|. Obviously, we have that
|ψ(σ(T ), σˆ(T ), k)− ψ(σ(T ), σˆ(T ), k − 1)|
=
∏
i<k:i∈Nn
(σim(T ))
I{ai(T )=m}(1 − σim(T ))
1−I{ai(T )=m}
×
∏
i>k:i∈Nn
(σˆim(T ))
I{ai(T )=m}(1− σˆim(T ))
1−I{ai(T )=m}
× |σkm(T )− σˆ
k
m(T )|, ∀k = 1, ..., |Nn|.
Since
∏
i<k:i∈Nn
(σkm(T ) + 1− σ
k
m(T ))
∏
i>k:i∈Nn
(σˆim(T ) +
1− σˆim(T )) = 1, we obtain that∑
Nmn (a(T ))⊆Nn
|ψ(σ(T ), σˆ(T ), k)− ψ(σ(T ), σˆ(T ), k − 1)|
=
∑
Nmn (a(T ))⊆Nn:ak(T )=m
|ψ(σ(T ), σˆ(T ), k)− ψ(σ(T ), σˆ(T ), k − 1)|
+
∑
Nmn (a(T ))⊆Nn:ak(T ) 6=m
|ψ(σ(T ), σˆ(T ), k)− ψ(σ(T ), σˆ(T ), k − 1)|
=2
∑
Nmn (a(T ))⊆Nn:ak(T )=m
|σkm(T )− σˆ
k
m(T )|
×
∏
i<k:i∈Nn
(σim(T ))
I{ai(T )=m}(1− σim(T ))
1−I{ai(T )=m}
×
∏
i>k:i∈Nn
(σˆim(T ))
I{ai(T )=m}(1− σˆim(T ))
1−I{ai(T )=m}
=2|σkm(T )− σˆ
k
m(T )|. (45)
Then, we have from (44) and (45) that
|Qnm(P (T ))−Q
n
m(Pˆ (T ))|
≤θmB
n
m
×
∑
Nmn (a(T ))⊆Nn
|ψ(σ(T ), σˆ(T ), |Nn|)− ψ(σ(T ), σˆ(T ), 0)|
=θmB
n
m
∑
Nmn (a(T ))⊆Nn
|
|Nn|−1∑
k=0
(ψ(σ(T ), σˆ(T ), |Nn| − k)
−ψ(σ(T ), σˆ(T ), |Nn| − k − 1)) |
≤θmB
n
m
∑
Nmn (a(T ))⊆Nn
|Nn|−1∑
k=0
|ψ(σ(T ), σˆ(T ), |Nn| − k)
− ψ(σ(T ), σˆ(T ), |Nn| − k − 1)|
=2θmB
n
m
|Nn|∑
k=1
|σkm(T )− σˆ
k
m(T )|. (46)
We then define a function f(P i(T )) , σim(T ) =
eγP
i
m(T )∑
M
m′=1
e
γPi
m′
(T )
. Since f(P i(T )) is continuously differen-
tiable, by the mean value theorem, we know that there exists
P¯ i(T ) = δ
(
P i(T )− Pˆ i(T )
)
with 0 < δ < 1 such that
σim(T )− σˆ
i
m(T )
=
eγP
i
m(T )∑M
m′=1 e
γP i
m′
(T )
−
eγPˆ
i
m(T )∑M
m′=1 e
γPˆ i
m′
(T )
=γ
eγP¯ im(T )∑Mm′=1 eγP¯ im′(T ) − e2γP¯ im(T )(∑M
m′=1 e
γP¯ i
m′
(T )
)2
(P im(T )− Pˆ im(T ))
−
M∑
m′=1,m′ 6=m
γ
eγP¯
i
m′
(T )eγP¯
i
m(T )(∑M
m′=1 e
γP¯ i
m′
(T )
)2 (P im(T )− Pˆ im(T )) .
Let Cim =
eγP¯
i
m(T )
∑M
m′=1
e
γP¯ i
m′
(T )
−e2γP¯
i
m(T )(∑
M
m′=1
e
γP¯ i
m′
(T )
)2 and Cim′ =
e
γP¯ i
m′
(T )
eγP¯
i
m(T )(∑
M
m′=1
e
γP¯i
m′
(T )
)2 . It is easy to check that Cim =∑M
m′=1,m′ 6=m C
i
m′ and 2Cim ≤ 1. Thus,
|σim(T )− σˆ
i
m(T )|
≤γCim|P
i
m(T )− Pˆ
i
m(T )|+
M∑
m′=1,m′ 6=m
Cim′ |P
i
m(T )− Pˆ
i
m(T )|
≤γ
Cim + M∑
m′=1,m′ 6=m
Cim′
 ||P i(T )− Pˆ i(T )||∞
≤γ||P i(T )− Pˆ i(T )||∞. (47)
Combining (47) and (46), we obtain
|Qnm(P (T ))−Q
n
m(Pˆ (T ))|
≤2γθmB
n
m
∑
i∈Nn
||P i(T )− Pˆ i(T )||∞
≤2γθmB
n
m|Nn|||P (T )− Pˆ (T )||∞.
It follows that if γ < 12maxm∈M,n∈N {θmBnm}maxn∈N {|Nn|} , the
mapping (Qnm, ∀m ∈ M, n ∈ N ) forms a maximum-norm
contraction.
I. Proof of Theorem 10
We first consider the following optimization problem for
each user n ∈ N :
max
σn
M∑
m=1
σnmQ
n
m(P
∗)−
1
γ
M∑
m=1
σnm lnσ
n
m (48)
subject to
M∑
m=1
σnm = 1, σ
n
m ≥ 0, ∀m ∈ M.
Recall that Qnm(P
∗) = E[Un(a(T ))|P
∗, an(T ) = m] denotes
the throughput of user n choosing channel m given that
other users adhere to the perceptions P ∗(i.e., other users’
mixed strategies since σi∗m = e
γPi∗m∑M
m′=1
e
γPi∗
m′
, ∀i 6= n). Then the
objective function (48) is to choose a mixed strategy σn for
user n to maximize its expected throughput Un(σn,σ∗−n) ,∑M
m=1 σ
n
mQ
n
m(P
∗) off the term 1γ
∑M
m=1 σ
n
m lnσ
n
m. The con-
straint is to ensure that the mixed strategy is feasible.
By the KKT condition, we obtain the optimal solution to
(48) as σˆnm = e
γQnm(P
∗)∑M
m′=1
e
γQn
m′
(P∗) , ∀m ∈ M. According to (25),
we have Qnm(P
∗) = Pn∗m and hence σˆnm = σi∗m, which implies
that
U(σ∗n,σ
∗
−n) ,
M∑
m=1
σn∗m Q
n
m(P
∗)
=max
σn
{
M∑
m=1
σnmQ
n
m(P
∗)−
1
γ
M∑
m=1
σnm lnσ
n
m
}
+
1
γ
M∑
m=1
σn∗m lnσ
n∗
m .
It is known from [37] that
1
γ
ln
(
M∑
m=1
eγQ
n
m(P
∗)
)
=max
σn
{
M∑
m=1
σnmQ
n
m(P
∗)−
1
γ
M∑
m=1
σnm lnσ
n
m
}
.
Since
max
σn
Un(σn,σ
∗
−n) = max
σn
M∑
m=1
σnmQ
n
m(P
∗)
= max
m∈M
Qnm(P
∗) ≤
1
γ
ln
(
M∑
m=1
eγQ
n
m(P
∗)
)
,
it follows that
U(σ∗n,σ
∗
−n) =
1
γ
ln
(
M∑
m=1
eγQ
n
m(P
∗)
)
+
1
γ
M∑
m=1
σn∗m lnσ
n∗
m
≥ max
σn
Un(σn,σ
∗
−n) +
1
γ
M∑
m=1
σn∗m lnσ
n∗
m ,
which completes the proof.
J. Proof of Theorem 11
We first define that U˜n(a)) =
ηnd
−α
n
ω0+ωnan+
∑
i∈N/{n}:ai=an
ηid
−α
in
. According to (27), we
first have that
Un(a) = θW log2
(
1 + U˜n(a))
)
.
Since f(z) = θW log2 (1 + z) is a a monotonically strictly
increasing function, we have that
sgn
(
Un(a
′
n, a−n)− Un(an, a−n)
)
=sgn
(
U˜n(a
′
n, a−n)− U˜n(an, a−n)
)
.
Suppose a user k changes its channel ak to a
′
k such that
strategy profile changes from a to a′ . We have that
Φ(a′)− Φ(a)
=−
∑
j 6=k
ηkηj
dαkj
I{a′k=aj}
+
∑
j 6=k
ηkηj
dαkj
I{ak=aj}
−
∑
i6=k
ηiηk
dαik
I{ai=a
′
k}
+
∑
i6=k
ηiηk
dαik
I{ai=ak}
−2Pkω
k
a
′
k
+ 2Pkω
k
ak
.
Since dij denotes the distance between user i and user j, we
have dij = dji. Thus,
Φ(a′)− Φ(a)
=−2
∑
i6=k
ηiηk
dαik
I{ai=a
′
k}
+ 2
∑
i6=k
ηiηk
dαik
I{ai=ak}
−2ηkω
k
a
′
k
+ 2ηkω
k
ak
=−2ηk
 ∑
i6=k:I
{ai=a
′
k
}
ηi
dαik
+ ωk,a′k

+2ηk
 ∑
i6=k:I{ai=ak}
ηi
dαik
+ ωk,ak

=2dαk
 ∑
i6=k:I
{ai=a
′
k
}
ηi
dαik
+ ωk,a′k
+ ω0

×
 ∑
i6=k:I{ai=ak}
ηi
dαik
+ ωk,ak + ω0

×
 ηkd−αk∑
i6=k:I
{ai=a
′
k
}
ηi
dαik
+ ωk
a
′
k
+ ω0
−
ηkd
−α
k∑
i6=k:I{ai=ak}
ηi
dαik
+ ωkak + ω0
)
=2dαk
 ∑
i6=k:I
{ai=a
′
k
}
ηi
dαik
+ ωk
a
′
k
+ ω0

×
 ∑
i6=k:I{ai=ak}
ηi
dαik
+ ωkak + ω0

×
(
U˜k(ak, a−k)− U˜k(a
′
k, a−k)
)
.
It follows that
sgn
(
Φ(a
′
n, a−n)− Φ(an, a−n)
)
=sgn
(
U˜n(a
′
n, a−n)− U˜n(an, a−n)
)
=sgn
(
Un(a
′
n, a−n)− Un(an, a−n)
)
.
